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NOTES
RAPED ONCE, BUT VIOLATED TWICE:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF A
RAPE VICTIM'S PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION
During the early morning hours of March 30, 1991, a twenty-
nine-year-old woman was allegedly raped by William Kennedy
Smith, the thirty-year-old nephew of Massachusetts Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy.' On April 7, 1991, her identity was disclosed in The
Sunday Mirror, a British tabloid.2 On April 15, 1991, her identity
was further publicized in the Globe, a supermarket tabloid based
in Boca Raton, Florida.3 On April 16, 1991, NBC's "Nightly News"
became the largest mainstream news organization to identify the
alleged rape victim.4 Finally, on April 17, 1991, one of the nation's
most circumspect newspapers, The New York Times, published a
I Kennedy Nephew Arrested, Facts on File, May 16, 1991, at 358E3, available in DIA-
LOG. On May 9, 1991, William Kennedy Smith was formally charged in connection with the
alleged rape. Id. On May 11, 1991, he surrendered to police. Id. On December 11, 1991, he
was acquitted of the rape charges. Kennedy Nephew Acquitted of Rape, Facts on File, Dec.
12, 1991, at 937C3, available in DIALOG.
2 Shaun Nix, Debate Over Naming Rape Victims, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 18, 1991, at Al; see
also On Names in Rape Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at A17 (London tabloid published
victim's name and photograph along with lurid account of alleged incident).
3 Robert Suro, Ruling Is Sought on Rape Name Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at B6.
The Globe has a circulation of 1.6 million. Tony Mauro, Paper Charged in Rape Case ID,
USA TODAY, May 10, 1991, at A3. Other key newspapers in the Florida area, including the
Palm Beach Post, the Sun-Sentinel, the Miami Herald, the St. Petersburg Times, and the
Tampa Tribune, declined to disclose the alleged victim's identity. James Warren, Naming
Rape Victims a Debate for Media, CHI. TRm., Apr. 18, 1991, at C5.
" Warren, supra note 3, at C5. The NBC newscast has an estimated average audience of
8 million homes. Id. The other major networks, ABC, CBS, and CNN, did not identify the
alleged victim. Id.
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story describing her in great detail. Amidst the resulting public
outrage, David Bludworth, the Palm Beach County prosecutor,
filed misdemeanor charges against Globe Communications, the
publishers of the Globe, for printing the name and photograph of
the alleged victim" in violation of a Florida statute.
Next to homicide, rape is the "ultimate violation of self';' rape
Fox Butterfield, Woman in Florida Rape Inquiry Fought Adversity and Sought Ac-
ceptance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at A17. The article indicated that the woman moved
from Ohio to Florida, where she held jobs sporadically, took college classes occasionally, and
resided in a house bought by her stepfather, a wealthy businessman. Id. Near Palm Beach
in South Florida, she made a transition from being an Ohio high school student with below-
average grades to a young woman with a life of leisure. Id. During her younger years, accord-
ing to one school official, the woman was popular socially and "had a little wild streak." Id.
The article also disclosed her brief affair with a member of a once prosperous Florida fam-
ily, which resulted in the birth of a child. Id. Other details included a report of her traffic
offenses and accidents, a listing of the nightspots she frequented, and the circumstances
surrounding her mother's divorce. Id. The article was sent to 650 other newspapers world-
wide through the New York Times News Service. Joan Beck, Fear and Loathing on the
'Kennedy Assault' Beat, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1991, at C13.
' See Howard Kurtz, Florida Tabloid Charged for Naming Alleged Victim, WASHING-
TON POST, May 10, 1991, at A9; see also William Glaberson, Times Article Naming Rape
Accuser Ignites Debate on Journalistic Value, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1991, at A14 (disclosure
by news organizations has "ignited a bitter debate across the country"). Considerable specu-
lation exists concerning David Bludworth's motives in prosecuting the newspaper. See Nick
Madigan, With Spotlight on Kennedys, Folksy Florida Prosecutor Braces for Heat, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1991, at A10. (suggesting that prosecutor, up for reelection, was motivated
by need for recognition).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West 1976). The Florida statute reads as follows:
No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed, pub-
lished, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address,
or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense within
this chapter. An offense under this section shall constitute a misdemeanor of the
second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083.
Id.
It is unclear whether the Florida statute is applicable to out-of-state media such as
NBC and The New York Times. See Alison Carper, Paper Charged in Naming Her, NEws-
DAY, May 10, 1991, at 17. There has never been a criminal prosecution under the statute.
See Robert Suro, Ruling Is Sought on Rape Name Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at B6
(paraphrasing Palm Beach County State Attorney David H. Bludworth).
' Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). The
Court further provided that
[a] rapist not only violates a victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably
causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. The long-
range effect upon the victim's life and health is likely to be irreparable; it is im-
possible to measure the harm which results. Volumes have been written by vic-
tims, physicians and psychiatric specialists on the lasting injury suffered by rape
victims. Rape is not a mere physical attack-it is destructive of the human per-
sonality. The remainder of the victim's life may be gravely affected, and this in
turn may have a serious detrimental effect upon her husband and any children she
may have.
Id. at 611-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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is also the most rapidly increasing and most misunderstood violent
crime in the United States.' Respecting the privacy of sexual as-
sault victims, many of the nation's newspapers have voluntarily re-
frained from publishing the names of alleged rape victims. 10 Al-
though, according to some recent polls, the public agrees with this
policy of self-restraint,11 the media still often display insensitivity
in reporting the nature and circumstances of a sexual assault. 2 At
times, "the media continue to glorify and romanticize violent sex-
ual behavior.' 3 The rape victim may also suffer insensitivity and
mistreatment from the police, medical professionals, and the pub-
lic. 14 As a consequence, rape victims often decline to seek justice
against the perpetrator of the crime.' 5 Thus, although the changes
ELIZABETH J. KEMMER, RAPE AND RAPE-RELATED ISSUES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
at xi (1977).
10 See Alex Jones, Naming Rape Victim Is Still a Murky Issue for the Press, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1989, at A18. Feminists' contention that victims were being "raped twice,"
once by their assailants and again by newspaper coverage that exposed them to public scru-
tiny, persuaded most editors and publishers to refrain from identifying victims. See id.; see
also Glaberson, supra note 6, at A14 (virtually all major news organizations protect alleged
rape victims unless victims choose to come forward); SEATTLE TImEs, Apr. 17, 1991, at A6
(except in cases where victim consented to identification).
11 See Marjie Lundstrom, Poll: Don't Name Rape Victims Decision Shouldn't Be Left
to Media, USA TODAY, Apr. 9, 1990, at 3A. An April 4, 1990 poll taken by Gannett News
Service/USA Today revealed that an overwhelming majority of the public believes that
"[t]he names of rape victims should be kept out of news stories unless the victim agrees,"
84% of those persons polled said that "rape victims should decide whether their names
become public," whereas a mere 5% "think the media should decide whether to print or
broadcast names." Id.; see also Sandra Sanchez, Rape Poll: No Names, Say 91%, USA To-
DAY, April 18, 1991, at 1A (in poll conducted by USA Today on April 17, 1991, percentage of
those persons polled who said that rape victims should decide for themselves whether their
names become public rose to 91%).
12 See JOHN M. MACDONALD, RAPE: OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 27 (1971). For exam-
ple, one well-publicized account of a sexual assault included reference to the discovery of
rocks in the vagina of a comatose victim. Id.
13 KEMMER, supra note 9, at xii.
14 Id. at xi. A rape victim's report to police is often met with "incredulous remarks and
unsympathetic attitudes." Id. During trial, responsibility for the crime is often attributed to
the rape victim. Id. Furthermore, a victim's physical, emotional, and psychological needs are
often inadequately served because of shortages in specialized personnel. Id. See generally
GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL As-
SAULT (1989) (examination of "legal processing" of rape cases); WILLIAM B. SANDERS, RAPE
AND WOMAN'S IDENTITY 81-124 (1980) (discussing police investigations of rape and construc-
tion of truth and lies in such investigations). For information regarding medical treatment
of rape victims, see generally AMERICAN HEALTH RESEARCH INST., RAPE-VICTIMS, OFFENDERS
& TREATMENT WITH MEDICAL SuBEcT ANALYSIS & RESEARCH GUIDE (1984).
15 See MACDONALD, supra note 12, at 27. Because the arrest of the rapist does not
preclude further risk of attack, many victims are frightened into remaining silent. Id. Fear
1992]
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in public attitudes towards rape, the effects of the women's libera-
tion movement, and the increased sensitivity of the criminal justice
system have resulted in an increase in reported rapes,'6 rape is still
one of the most underreported crimes."7 Unfortunately, the after-
math of the Palm Beach incident may perpetuate such inaction by
victims."8
Dissatisfied with the lack of protection for rape victims, many
states have initiated legislative reforms ranging from a redefinition
of the crime of rape to the enactment of laws designed to protect a
victim's right of privacy. 19 Several states, including Florida, now
statutorily prohibit the disclosure of a rape victim's identity. 0
of newspaper publicity and of embarrassment in the courtroom are other factors that may
discourage victims from reporting rapes. Id. A wife's fear of rejection by her husband may
induce silence. Id. Finally, many victims do not report sexual assaults by family members or
close friends. Id. at 27; see also Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co., 436 So.
2d 328, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (rape victim agreed to testify based on assurances by
state that her name and photograph would not be published).
1" See JEANNE C. MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 42-43 (1982).
17 See M. Koss & M. HARVEY, THE RAPE VICTIM: CLINICAL AND COMMUNITY APPROACHES
TO TREATMENT I (1987) (citing LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., Criminal Victimiza-
tion Surveys, in 13 American Cities (1975)). Law enforcement officials estimate that "for
every rape reported, three to ten rapes are committed but not reported." Id.; see also Hu-
BERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 75 (1980) (although estimates vary,
most authorities agree that between 10% and 30% of rapes are reported to police) (citations
omitted); SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHE-
SIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 185-86 (1979) (citing studies from 1950s and 1970s on women's
reluctance to report rapes).
18 See Sanchez, supra note 11, at IA. According to an April 17, 1991 USA Today poll,
46% of the women polled said that if they were raped, they would be less likely to report
the crime if they knew that their names would become public. Id. As a consequence of the
publicity received by the rape case in Palm Beach, "victims already are calling the crisis
center, confused about whether they should report rapes." Judy Keen & Carolyn Pesce,
Misadventure in Paradise-Kennedy Name Keeps Case in Headlines-Clout, Cash Com-
plicate Investigation, USA TODAY, Apr. 18, 1991, at lA.
11 See NATIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS,
HEALTH FACILITIES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 271 (1975). A number of states have
adopted major revisions of the definition of rape that categorize the crime into varying de-
grees of offenses. Id. Another primary concern of reformists is to eliminate the requirement
of evidence corroborating the victim's testimony. Id. A second major evidentiary reform con-
cerns restricting admissibility of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct. Id. at 271-73.
20 Larry Rohter, Charges of Naming Woman in Rape Case Are Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1991, at A16. Georgia, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have similar statutes prohib-
iting the disclosure of a rape victim's identity. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (Harrison
1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983
& Supp. 1991). The publicity surrounding the Kennedy Smith incident has renewed legisla-
tive activity in the area of privacy rights of rape victims. See Andrew Blum, Palm Beach
Rape Case Bolsters Privacy Efforts, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1991, at 9. The New York and Iowa
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This Note will focus on the constitutionality of such laws and
other measures that protect the privacy rights of rape victims. Part
One will review the respective foundations of privacy rights and
First Amendment rights, which are often in conflict in cases in-
volving the publication of rape victims' identities. Part Two will
consider the constitutionality of state statutes proscribing the re-
porting of truthful information such as the identity of a rape vic-
tim. Part Three will address collateral means of protecting the pri-
vacy of rape victims, including courtroom closures and "gag
orders." Finally, this Note will conclude that the Florida statute
under which Globe Communications is being prosecuted is uncon-
stitutional, and that the case will fail to answer the question of
how the state may protect the privacy of rape victims.
I. THE RIGHTS IN CONFLICT
A. Background-The Right of Privacy
In comparison to more established legal doctrines, the right of
privacy2l is a recent development.22 It was spurred by the publica-
tion in 1890 of what became the seminal article in the area, in
which Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis advocated the recogni-
tion of an independent right of privacy.23 In particular, the impro-
prieties of the press with respect to private matters convinced
these commentators to advocate a change in the existing law.24 In
legislatures and the United States Congress have introduced similar legislation protecting
the privacy of sexual assault victims. Id.
21 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). In his popular treatise on tort law,
Judge Cooley coined the phrase, "the right ... to be let alone." Id. Ironically, although his
terminology has become synonymous with a right to privacy, Judge Cooley used this term to
encompass the individual's right to be free from physical intrusions. Id. at 24, 29 (discussing
"the right to immunity froin attacks and injuries").
22 See WLLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS 951 (8th ed. 1988). Prior to 1890, no English
or American court had expressly granted relief based on the right to privacy. Id.
213 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 195,
195-96 (1890) (arguing that political, social, and economic changes frequently entail recogni-
tion of new rights).
24 See id. at 196. The article stated the following:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
of decency . . . . To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are
spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers .... [S]olitude and privacy
have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and inven-
tion have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
1992]
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1903, New York became the first state to accept the right of pri-
vacy,25 which gained momentum in the decades to follow." The
Supreme Court has since that time recognized a constitutional
right of privacy. 7 Almost a century since its inception, the right is
"firml, ingrained in the common law of most states and occupies a
prominent place in American society and jurisprudence. '2 8
The common law right of privacy has given rise to four torts
for four distinct interferences with an individual's privacy.2 9 The
25 See Ch. 132, §§ 1-2, [1903] N.Y. LAWS 308, as amended, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-
51 (McKinney 1991). In 1902, however, the New York Court of Appeals had rejected the
existence of a right to privacy. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443
(N.Y. 1902) (expressing fear that adoption of Warren and Brandeis's proposals would result
in absurd and illogical litigation). In response to this decision, the following year the New
York legislature enacted a statute that prohibited the use of the name, portrait, or picture
of any person for "advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade" without his written
consent. See Ch. 132, §§ 1-2, as amended, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1991).
The first major court to adopt Warren and Brandeis's views was the Supreme Court of
Georgia. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
"s See generally Basil W. Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 B.U. L. REV. 353, 353-55
(1932) (arguing that every person has absolute right to demand freedom from public scru-
tiny of private affairs); Wilfred Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 713, 731 (1948) (because of circumspect application of doctrine, right of
privacy will not lose its vigor in immediate future); Wilbur Larremore, The Law of Privacy,
12 COLUM. L. REv. 693, 707-08 (1912) (prognosis for establishment and development of right
of privacy is favorable).
2 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing a "zone of pri-
vacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656 (1961) (right of privacy is no less important than any other right reserved to the
people) (citation omitted); see also Erwin N. Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone, 55 N.W.
U. L. REv. 216, 216-17 (1960) (as an underlying theme of Bill of Rights, right to be let alone
is implicit in Constitution).
28 Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis,
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1990). See generally John A. McLaughlin, Comment, Intru-
sions upon Informational Seclusion in the Computer Age, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 831, 835
(1984) (tort of invasion of privacy "generally accepted by the courts"). After the Georgia
Supreme Court's ruling in Pavesich, "virtually every state, by either judicial decision or
statute, has created protection for the right of privacy." Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Pri-
vacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEx. L.
REv. 1395, 1405 (1987) (footnote omitted). For a historical account of the development of
the right, see Kramer, supra.
2" W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. First, the tort of appropriation prohibits
the unauthorized annexation of one's name or likeness for another's benefit. Id. Second, the
tort of unreasonable intrusion prohibits highly offensive intrusion upon the seclusion of an-
other. Id. § 117, at 854. The third type of interference concerns publicity that places one in
a false light in the public eye. Id. § 117, at 863. Fourth, the tort of public disclosure of
private facts penalizes the publication of "highly objectionable .. .private information
about the plaintiff, even though it is true and no action would lie for defamation." Id. § 117,
at 856.
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tort most analogous to statutes proscribing the publication of
truthful information, such as a rape victim's identity, is the tort of
public disclosure of private facts,30 which creates liability for the
public disclosure of private facts that would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 1 Public disclosures
with respect to public figures and matters of public interest, how-
ever, were privileged under the common law.32
The public figure privilege is premised on the fact that certain
persons, by their accomplishments, fame, or profession, give the
public a legitimate interest in their affairs.3 3 The privilege afforded
matters of public interest similarly arises out of the public's right
to such information and the freedom of the press to report it3 4
Among other matters, this privilege has been extended to criminal
activity,35 suicide," and marriage.3 Therefore, in proscribing the
reporting of a rape victim's identity, the court should consider
whether the victim is a public figure or whether the circumstances
of the attack are a matter of public concern.3
B. Background-The First Amendment
The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech, which
was incorporated to the states via the Due Process Clause of the
30 See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (recognizing cause of
action for disclosure of rape victim's identity).
1 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 117, at 856. The Second Restatement of Torts
requires in addition that the public not have a legitimate interest in the information. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
32 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 117, at 859.
3 Id. § 117, at 859-60.
31 Id. § 117, at 860.
35 See Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (sedition).
36 See Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P.2d 491, 495-96 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
37 See Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959). The court stated
that "[t]he publication of a newsworthy event should always be privileged, unless its presen-
tation is such that the intrusion upon the lives of the parties named in it clearly goes be-
yond the limits of decency." Id.
" Cf. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). The analysis of
laws restricting the disclosure of truthful information under the right of privacy is similar to
the constitutional analysis under the law of defamation. See id. But cf. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 29, § 117, at 862 (distinguishing public figure concept developed under right of
privacy from public figure concept developed under defamation law). When the speech in-
volves a matter of public concern and the plaintiff is a public figure, constitutional protec-
tion is afforded the media defendant. Id. When the speech involves a matter of public con-
cern but the plaintiff is a private figure, the constitutional protections are diminished. Id.
When the speech is a matter of private concern, and the plaintiff is a private figure, there
may not be any constitutional protection. Id.
1992]
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Fourteenth Amendment,39 has become "one of the preeminent
rights of Western democratic theory. '40 From Justice Holmes's
"marketplace-of-ideas" theory of free speech,4' to Justice Bran-
deis's "safety-valve" approach,42 the value of free debate on public
issues is well established.43
In contrast to protections for life, liberty, and property pro-
vided under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the free-
speech language of the First Amendment is absolute.44 Neverthe-
less, laws forbidding speech are commonplace.45 Moreover, freedom
of speech does not include the right to speak on any subject at any
time,46 nor is the press free to publish with impunity under all
39 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 558 (1951) (Due Process Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment makes First Amendment principles applicable to states); Jones v. City
of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600 (1942) (same); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(assuming that Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected freedom of speech).
40 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 934 (4th ed. 1991)
(footnote omitted). The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"' See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous... warrants making any excep-
tion to the sweeping command, 'Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech.' ").
11 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927). In his concurrence, Justice
Brandeis stated the following:
Those who won our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.... [T]hey knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of
punishment for its infraction; ... that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies ....
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they es-
chewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recogniz-
ing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitu-
tion so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
" See Terminillo v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). "The vitality of our civil and
political institutions depends on free discussion." Id. The right to speak freely is a trade-
mark of our democratic society. Id.
" See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT.
REV. 245, 248-49, 252-53. The strict language of the First Amendment is highlighted by a
comparison with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and
seizures." See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 40, at 942. But cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (well understood that right of free speech is not absolute).
"I See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 414 (6th ed. 1986)
(laws prohibiting perjury, blackmail, and fraud).
40 See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950) (although
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circumstances.47
Historically, a restriction that enjoins publication before the
fact has been regarded with more disfavor than a restriction that
imposes sanctions for publication after the fact.4 s In a case firmly
embedding this "prior restraint" doctrine into modern jurispru-
dence,4" the Supreme Court noted that although protection from
prior restraints is not unlimited, "the limitation has been recog-
nized only in exceptional cases. 5 0 Thus, a prior restraint comes
before the Court "bearing a heavy presumption against its consti-
tutional validity."'5 1 The punishment of speech subsequent to pub-
First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging free speech, suppres-
sion of speech inimical to public welfare permitted). For instance, the most stringent protec-
tion of free speech would not protect an individual who falsely shouts "fire" in a theater.
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (explaining that character of every act
depends upon circumstances).
17 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (First Amendment does not invali-
date every incidental burden on press resulting from civil or criminal statutes that serve
substantial public interests).
" See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 40, at 969. Until 1694, English authors con-
tended with an elaborate system of licensing that made unlicensed publications illegal. Id.
at 936. Under the English licensing system, nothing could be published without prior ap-
proval of the church or state authorities. Id. at 969. The English licensing system was abol-
ished in 1695. Id. For background material on prior restraints, see generally id. at 935-36,
969-78.
" See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931). In Near, appellant, the owner of
a publication, invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in challenging
a Minnesota statutory licensing scheme. Id. at 705. The statute authorized suppression of
defamatory newspapers by injunction, unless the publisher could prove truth and good mo-
tive, and rendered further publication in violation of the injunction punishable as contemp-
tuous. Id. at 701-05. The Court noted that the statute did not punish, except in violation of
a court order, and was a prior restraint on publication. Id. at 715. In holding that the statute
violated the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
added that the statute was not saved by the statutory defenses of good faith and truth. Id.
at 721-23. The Court provided the following historical perspective:
[F]or approximately one hundred and fifty years there has been almost an entire
absence of attempts to impose previous restraints upon publications .... The
general principle that the constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press gives
immunity from previous restraints has been approved in many decisions under the
provisions of state constitutions.
Id. at 718-19 (footnotes omitted).
" See id. at 716. In discussing possible exceptions, the Court stated that "[n]o one
would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops." Id. (footnote omitted).
8' Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). The Court has also provided
that the government "'carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
such a restraint.'" New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). In New York Times,
the United States sought to enjoin The New York Times and the Washington Post from
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lication, however, exacts less judicial scrutiny.52
Thus, while the Court has indicated the First Amendment's
preferred position,53 it has often employed a balancing test that
carefully weighs conflicting interests. 5 4 In a series of recent cases,
the Supreme Court has attempted to balance the important state
interests in maintaining the privacy of sexual assault victims
against the legitimate interests of the news media in reporting
newsworthy events.5 5 According to at least one court, such privacy
publishing the contents of a classified historical study on Vietnam policy. Id. In a frag-
mented decision containing six separate opinions, the Court held that the government had
not satisfied its burden. Id. Justice Black wrote that "[b]oth the history and the language of
the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news,
whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints." Id. at 717 (Black,
J., concurring). Although Justice Brennan recognized some extreme situations in which the
First Amendment's ban on prior restraints may be overridden, the case exemplifies the
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality against prior restraints. Id. at 725-26 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
52 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 733. Justice White explained that the failure to
effect a prior restraint does not preclude post-publication 19unishment:
Prior restraints require an unusually heavy justification under the First Amend-
ment; but failure by the Government to justify prior restraints does not measure
its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for criminal publication. That the
Government mistakenly chose to proceed by injunction does not mean that it
could not successfully proceed in another way.
Id. (White, J., concurring).
"' See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (stating that First Amend-
ment rights of freedom of press, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion are in preferred
position).
" See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (Court has "es-
chewed" absolutes in favor of weighing particular circumstances presented); see also infra
notes 76-86 and accompanying text (discussing Daily Mail). For a discussion of the use of
balancing methodology in First Amendment cases, see Alexander Meiklejohn, The Balanc-
ing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 4 passim (1961); John
H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1500-02 (1975); Laurent B. Frantz, The
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE. L.J. 1424 passim (1962).
Justice White, in commenting on such balancing, argued the following:
The Court's concern for a free press is appropriate, but such concerns should
be balanced against rival interests in a civilized and humane society. An absolutist
view of the former leads to insensitivity as to the latter.
... While I would not want to live in a society where freedom of the press was
unduly limited, I also find regrettable an interpretation of the First Amendment
that fosters such a degree of irresponsibility on the part of the news media.
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 547 n.2 (1989) (White, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of Florida Star, see infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530 (noting the tension between the right of free
press and the right "to personal privacy against the publication of truthful information");
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977) (under First and
Fourteenth Amendments, press may not be prevented from publishing public information
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rights and First Amendment freedoms can coexist.56
II. PROSCRIBING DISSEMINATION OF TRUTHFUL INFORMATION:
THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEWPOINT
A. Cox Broadcasting
In 1975, the Supreme Court, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn,57 ruled that a state may not allow damages for an invasion
of privacy caused by the publication of a rape victim's identity
when the victim's identity is a matter of public record.5 8 The ac-
tion was brought against a television station by the father of a
murdered rape victim whose identity had been publicized in viola-
tion of a Georgia statute e.5  The television station owners who had
broadcast the victim's name contended that the statute violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.6
The Court in Cox Broadcasting noted that, in cases involving
the dissemination of truthful information, "claims of privacy most
directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and
press."6 ' Although truth constituted a defense to a defamation ac-
tion,62 the Court had never ruled on its applicability in nondefama-
tion actions.6 3 The Cox Broadcasting Court, however, asserted that
about a minor child); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 486-87 (1975) (discuss-
ing "zone of privacy... within which the state may protect [each individual] from intru-
sion by the press").
" See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971) (contending that
First Amendment freedoms do not require total abrogation of right to privacy and that
goals of each may be achieved with minimum intrusion upon the other).
:7 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
1 Id. at 494-95. The victim was named at the trial, which the reporter attended, and in
the indictments, which were matters of public record. Id. at 473 n.3.
09 Id. at 471-72. The Georgia statute made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast
the name or identity of a rape victim. Id.; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (Harrison 1988).
11 Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 473-74.
" Id. at 489.
02 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770 (1986) (under com-
mon law of defamation, truth is absolute defense); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
375 (1974) (same). Although the defense of truth was a controversial topic before and at the
time of ratification of the First Amendment, there is no evidence that the Amendment was
intended to protect all truthful statements from criminal sanctions. Id. at 1200-01. In an
early case recognizing the defense of truth, a New York court explained that "this doctrine
will not go to tolerate libels upon private character, or the circulation of charges for sedi-
tious and wicked ends, or to justify to exposing to the public eye one's personal defects or
misfortunes." People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
'3 See Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 490-91 ("[C]ourt has... carefully left this ques-
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the commission of a crime and the corresponding judicial proceed-
ings were matters of public concern and fell within the press's re-
sponsibility to report the operations of government.6 4 The Court
noted that a contrary ruling would "invite timidity and self-censor-
ship" within the press6 5 and that "the interests in privacy fade
when the information involved already appears on the public rec-
ord."66 Read narrowly, Cox Broadcasting thus holds that the press
cannot be sanctioned for publishing truthful information on the
public record.6 7
B. Oklahoma Publishing
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided another case involving
the publication of truthful information, this time with respect to a
tion open."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Time, the plaintiff, James Hill, and
his family involuntarily became the subjects of a major news story after being held hostage
by escaped convicts. Id. at 378. Mr. Hill resisted the media's efforts to keep him and his
family in the public spotlight. Id. Nevertheless, a book and play were written depicting the
Hills's experience. Id. Mr. Hill brought an action for invasion of privacy, based on New
York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51, against Life Magazine, which falsely reported that the play
portrayed the Hills' actual experience. Id. The trial court accepted Life's contention that
the article was "a subject of legitimate news interest" and "of value and concern to the
public." Time, 385 U.S. at 386. Adhering to the trial court's finding, the Supreme Court held
that liability could only be predicated on a finding of knowledge or reckless disregard of
falsity. Id. at 386-91. More importantly, the Court, in dicta, asserted that the constitutional
limitations pertaining to newsworthy persons and events do not preclude liability when
"[r]evelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to
outrage the community's notions of decency." Id. at 384. Thus, it appears that the Court
expressly reserved decision on the issue of whether truth is a defense in nondefamation
cases involving purely private matters.
" Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 492. The Court explained that
in a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with
which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessa-
rily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those opera-
tions. Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to report
fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official records and docu-
ments open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations. Without
the information provided by the press most of us and many of our representatives
would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration
of government generally.
Id. at 491-92; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (great responsibility
placed upon news media to report governmental proceedings fully and accurately).
Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496.
'4 Id. at 494-95.
e See id. at 497. The Court expressly reserved the issue of whether states may consti-
tutionally prevent access by the public and press to official records. Id. at 496 n.26. The
Court also refused to extend its holding to encompass information derived from other
sources. Id. at 497 n.27.
RAPE VICTIM'S PRIVACY
juvenile criminal defendant. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court6" involved an 11-year-old boy on trial for fatally shooting a
railroad switchman.6 9 While attending a detention hearing, report-
ers, including one from the Oklahoma Publishing Company's news-
papers, learned the juvenile's identity.7° Although several pub-
lished stories had already disclosed the child's identity,71 the trial
judge entered a pretrial order enjoining the media from further
"publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating, in any manner, the
name or picture of [a] minor child. 7 2
The Supreme Court cited Cox Broadcasting as authority for
the proposition that a state may not constitutionally prohibit pub-
lication of truthful information revealed in a judicial proceeding.73
Noting the state's implicit approval of the press's presence at the
detention hearing, the Court ruled that the boy's identity had been
"publicly revealed. '74
Like Cox Broadcasting, Oklahoma Publishing should be given
a narrow construction.7 5 At the very least, it appears that informa-
tion may be "publicly revealed" and become a part of the "public
record" through the state's failure to take affirmative action to
shield the information from public scrutiny.
C. Daily Mail
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided another case in which the
state prosecuted a newspaper for publishing a juvenile offender's
68 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
" Id. at 309.
70 Id.
71 Id. A number of newspapers, including those of the Oklahoma Publishing Company,
had published stories using the boy's name and photograph. Id. Several television stations
broadcast film footage of him, and radio stations identified him by name. Id.
712 Id. at 308. Unlike the previous detention hearing, a closed hearing was the focus of
the pretrial order. Id. at 309-10. The trial judge based the pretrial order on two state stat-
utes. Id.; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, §§ 1111, 1125 (West Supp. 1976) (children's
hearings shall be private unless specifically ordered by judge, and case records shall be open
to public inspection only by court order). Although the Supreme Court never addressed the
issue of whether the pretrial order constituted a prior restraint on speech, Oklahoma Pub-
lishing has become known as a case involving "a classic prior restraint." See Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (discussed infra notes 76-86).
73 Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. at 310-11.
7' Id. at 311.
76 See id. at 311-12. The Court held that "[u]nder these circumstances," the pretrial
order violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The Court did not hold, however,
that such pretrial orders would be unconstitutional under all circumstances. See id.
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identity. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,76 a fourteen-year-
old boy, identified by seven different eyewitnesses, was arrested for
the murder of a classmate.77 While visiting the murder scene, re-
porters obtained the youth's identity by questioning various wit-
nesses, the police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney.7 Al-
though another newspaper and at least three radio stations had
previously broadcast the youth's name, the Daily Mail was in-
dicted for violating a West Virginia Statute prohibiting such dis-
closures without prior court permission.7
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court issued a writ of
prohibition on the ground that the statute operated as a prior re-
straint on speech,80 the United States Supreme Court determined
that resolution of the case did not turn on the prior restraint is-
sue.8 ' Emphasizing the need for a state interest of "the highest
form," the Court noted that statutes penalizing "the publication of
truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional stan-
dards. 8 2 In holding that the state's interest in protecting the ano-
nymity of the juvenile offender failed to satisfy constitutional re-
quirements, the Court identified several of the West Virginia
" 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
77 Id. at 99. The respondents, the Charleston Daily Mail and the Charleston Gazette,
learned of the shooting by monitoring the police band frequency on the radio. Id. They
immediately dispatched reporters and photographers to the scene of the crime. Id.
78 Id.
71 Id. at 99-100. The West Virginia statute provided in part, the following: "[Nior shall
the name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, be published
in any newspaper without a written order of the court." W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976). Be-
cause of the statutory prohibition, the Daily Mail initially omitted the youth's name from
its story. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 99. Believing that the information had become public
knowledge, it subsequently decided to identify the youth. Id. at 99-100.
80 Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 100.
"' Id. at 101.
8' Id. at 102; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 829
(1978). Landmark Communications involved a Virginia statute that criminalized the disclo-
sure of information regarding judicial review proceedings that the State Constitution and
statutes declared confidential. Id. at 830. At the outset, the Court dismissed the prior re-
straint issue and asserted that the state's interest must be sufficient to justify the statute's
encroachment on First Amendment guarantees. Id. at 838-41. Although legitimate state in-
terests were presented, the Court concluded that these interests failed to justify the en-
croachments on speech that "lies near the core of the First Amendment." Id. at 838. The
Court added, "'Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amend-
ment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.'" Id. (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). The Court narrowed its holding, however, by refusing to adopt a cate-
gorical approach by which all truthful reporting about public officials would be protected by
the First Amendment. Id.
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statute's shortcomings.8s First, the statute did not apply to all
forms of publication equally.84 Second, the statute did not achieve
its stated purpose because the juvenile's identity had already been
publicized prior to the Daily Mail's disclosure.8 Third, the statute
was not necessary to protect the confidentiality of juvenile
proceedings.86
D. Florida Star
Fourteen years after its decision in Cox Broadcasting, the
Court, in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,87 decided a case with facts similar
to those surrounding Florida's recent prosecution of Globe Com-
munications. In Florida Star, the Duval County Sheriff's Depart-
ment prepared a report that identified the victim of a sexual as-
sault by her full name. 8 A Florida Star reporter copied the police
report verbatim in an unrestricted press room.89 The newspaper
subsequently violated its own internal policy by publishing the
identity of the victim in the "police reports" section of the newspa-
per.90 The victim sued the Florida Star for negligently violating
section 794.03 of the Florida Statutes, the same statute that was
involved in the Globe Communications prosecution.9 ' The newspa-
per contended that imposing civil liability on it for disclosing the
81 Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104. The Court acknowledged that the prohibition was
designed to facilitate the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring); see also EDWARD ELDEFONSO, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER 166
(3d ed. 1978) (publication of juvenile offenders' names impedes social adjustment and im-
pairs rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice system).
6' Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104-05. Aside from newspapers, the statute did not restrict
publication via electronic media or any other form of publication. Id. at 105. The newspaper
had further contended that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did
not apply to all forms of media equally. Id. at 106 n.4.
85 Id. at 105.
86 Id.
87 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
88 Id. at 527. The Florida District Court of Appeal referred to the appellee by her ini-
tials "in order to preserve [her] privacy interests." Id. at 527 n.2. Respecting those same
interests, the United States Supreme Court also referred to her as "B.J.F." Id.
8) Id.
00 Id. at 527-28. The article provided, in part, that the victim was "enroute to her bus
stop, when an unknown black man ran up behind the lady and placed a knife to her
neck . . . . The suspect then undressed the lady and had sexual intercourse with her before
fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch and gold necklace." Id. at 527.
8 Id. at 528. As noted previously, the Florida statute proscribes the publication of a
rape victim's identity through any instrument of mass communication. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.03 (West 1976).
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rape victim's identity violated the First Amendment.2
Although the Florida Star Court distinguished the case from
Cox Broadcasting, it nevertheless held that imposing damages on
the Florida Star violated the First Amendment."3 First, because
the Florida Star obtained the identifying information from the
government, imposing liability on the newspaper would result in
self-censorship within the press.9 4 Thus, the statute was not nar-
rowly tailored because more limited means were available to pro-
tect the victim short of punishing the reporting of truthful infor-
mation.9 5 Second, civil actions under section 794.03 impermissibly
failed to require a case-by-case evaluation of liability. 6 Regardless
of whether a reasonable person would have found the disclosure
highly offensive or whether the victim was already widely known,
liability followed automatically from publication. Third, section
794.03 was underinclusive because it prohibited publication only
by an "instrument of mass communication." 98 The Court asserted
that the state must demonstrate its interest by applying the prohi-
bition equally to all disseminators.9 9 In a strong dissent, three jus-
tices objected to each of the majority's three "independent
reasons."'
100
Although Florida Star was decided in favor of the media, the
Court specifically left open the possibility of sanctions for publish-
ing a rape victim's name. e'0 Thus, it is submitted that that decision
9" Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528.
93 Id. at 532.
"' Id. at 538-39.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 539.
" Id. at 539-40. The Court noted that under the statute, and unlike the common law
tort of public disclosure of private facts, liability followed regardless of whether the victim's
identity is already known throughout the community, whether the victim has voluntarily
called attention to the offense, or whether the matter is a reasonable subject of public inter-
est. Id. Since the statute did not require scienter, it afforded truthful publications less First
Amendment protection than even the least-protected defamatory falsehoods. Id.
'" Id. at 540.
" Id. at 540-41. The Court concluded that because of the statute's underinclusiveness,
the statute did not achieve its stated purpose. Id. For instance, the statute did not apply to
"backyard gossip," even though such communications could be equally devastating to a vic-
tim. Id. at 540.
"o Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). In a dissent jointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor, Justice White rejected the first reason and argued that rape victims'
names can be discovered even when the state takes precautions. Id. at 547. He found the
majority's second reason inapposite under the circumstances and did not agree with the
court's rationale behind the third reason. Id. at 548-50.
"o' Id. at 541. "We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitution-
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established a window of opportunity for the protection of rape
victims.
E. Proscribing Dissemination of Truthful Information: The
Cases Synthesized
A statutory prohibition on disclosure, like section 794.03 of the
Florida Statutes, serves to protect a rape victim's privacy and to
encourage reporting of the crime. 102 However, in light of the recent
Supreme Court cases, substantial constitutional barriers to such a
prohibition on truthful speech exist. First, legislation may not con-
stitute a prior restraint on speech except in exceptional circum-
stances."°' Second, the statute must apply indiscriminately to all
forms of publication, including the individual disseminator,1 04 in
order to achieve its stated purpose.105 An underinclusive statute
may also violate the Equal Protection Clause.10 6 Third, the statute
ally protected, ... or even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a
victim of a sexual offense." Id. For a discussion of Florida Star, see Kathryn W. Hughes,
Florida Star v. B.J.F.: Can the State Regulate the Press in the Interest of Protecting the
Privacy of Rape Victims?, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1061 (1990); Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v.
Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1195 (1990); Stephanie M.
Bartels, Note, Imposing Liability on Newspaper for Publishing Name of Rape Victim Ob-
tained from Publicly Revealed Police Report Violates First Amendment, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 523 (1989).
1'2 See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537 (state urged that punishing publication of
rape victims' identity served three related interests: protecting victims' privacy, protecting
victims' safety, and encouraging victims to report crime without fear of exposure).
103 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. But cf. Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 512-13 (1980) (per curiam) (upholding CIA agent's agreement to submit any pro-
posed publication for prior review; failure to do so impaired CIA's ability to perform statu-
tory duties). For further discussion of contractual agreements between journalists and
sources, see Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-
Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609 passim (1991); Michael Dicke, Note, Promises
and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on News Source Recovery for Breach of a
Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553, 1568-74 (1989).
' See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540. In commenting upon the underinclusiveness of
section 794.03, the Florida Star Court asserted that "[w]hen a State attempts the extraordi-
nary measure of punishing truthful publication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate
its commitment to advancing this interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the
smalltime disseminator as well as the media giant." Id. The Court also noted that
[ain individual who maliciously spreads word of the identity of a rape victim is
thus not covered, despite the fact that the communication of such information to
persons who live near, or work with, the victim may have consequences as devas-
tating as the exposure of her name to large numbers of strangers.
Id.
joa See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105. In Daily Mail, the Court concluded that the statute
did not achieve its purpose because it did not apply to electronic media. See id.
106 See id. In Daily Mail, however, the Court did not decide whether the statute in fact
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must provide for a case-by-case determination of guilt, thus not
penalizing those defendants who publish when the victim's identity
is already widely publicized, or when the victim has voluntarily
called attention to the offense, or when the victim's identity is a
reasonable subject of public concern.107 Imposing strict liability in
these instances will not further the statute's purpose."' 8 A brief ex-
amination of the Globe Communications prosecution will illustrate
these principles.
F. The Globe Prosecution: Unconstitutional Protection
As previously noted, the Palm Beach County prosecutor filed
misdemeanor charges against Globe Communications, State v.
Globe Communications Corp.,09 for publishing two articles identi-
fying the woman allegedly raped by William Kennedy Smith.110
After synthesizing the relevant Supreme Court cases,"' Judge
Robert V. Parker concluded that Florida Statute 794.03 was un-
constitutional both on its face and as applied." 2 Noting the stat-
ute's failure to provide a mechanism for case-by-case determina-
tion, Judge Parker -held that the statute "is unconstitutionally
overbroad and that no valid state purpose is served by imposing
criminal liability on [the] defendant, The Globe Communications
Corp."'113 He also held that the statute was underinclusive because
"the selective ban on mass media disclosures cannot be regarded as
protecting a state interest of the highest order."" 4 Finally, Judge
Parker held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied be-
violated equal protection in failing to apply equally to all forms of publication. See id. at
106 n.4.
107 See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535, 539.
"08 See id. at 540. Under a strict liability standard, publications of truthful information
would receive less constitutional protection than defamatory falsehoods. Id. The Court
noted the impermissibility of categorical prohibitions upon media access when First Amend-
ment interests are implicated. Id.; accord Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 608 (1982) (invalidating state statute providing for categorical exclusion of public from
trials for sexual offenses involving juvenile victims).
... No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 24, 1991).
110 Id. at 1.
111 Id. at 8-12, 14-15.
112 Id. at 13-15.
.11 Id. at 13. Individualized adjudication would have revealed that "the victim's identify
was a matter of public record" because "[a]n information accusing Smith of sexual battery
and simple battery of the victim, and naming her, was filed with the Clerk of the Circuit
Court of Palm Beach County, Florida, on May 9, 1991." Id. at 4.
114 Id. at 15.
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cause the alleged rape victim's identity "was widely known to nu-
merous members of the public and the media and her identity had
been published by several British tabloid-type newspapers before
the Globe published her name."'115
In light of the principal cases discussed above, the trial court's
decision in Globe Communications to declare Florida's statute un-
constitutional was inevitable. The same statute was found underin-
clusive by the Supreme Court in Florida Star, and yet the Florida
Legislature failed to correct the statute's constitutional infirmi-
ties.116 Although, under proper circumstances, the Supreme Court
may be willing to uphold a statute that punishes the disclosure of a
rape victim's identity, Globe Communications does not present
such a statute.
III. COLLATERAL MEANS OF PROTECTING PRIVACY:
GAG ORDERS AND COURTROOM CLOSURES
A. Introduction
Because constitutional protection has been afforded only to
the publication of lawfully obtained information, "the government
retains ample means of safeguarding significant interests upon
which publication may impinge, including protecting a rape vic-
tim's anonymity."'1 7 In Florida Star, the Supreme Court suggested
that if the information resided in private possession, the govern-
ment could proscribe its nonconsensual acquisition; if the informa-
tion were in government custody, it could be classified, and govern-
ment officials could be punished for disseminating it. 8 In each of
"I Id. at 13. In discussing the issue of whether the Florida statute operated as a prior
restraint, Judge Parker suggested that although "[i]t no longer makes any difference
whether the restriction comes in the form of an injunction or in the form of a penal 'subse-
quent punishment' under federal or state decisional law," id. at 17, "[tlhe statute in ques-
tion is probably not a 'prior restraint' as that term has been traditionally used," id. at 15.
He also held that the statute violated Florida's state constitution. Id. at 18.
"I Id. at 15. Judge Parker noted that "[b]ecause'the statute has not been amended
following the decision in The Florida Star case, I must follow the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in that case as binding on this Court." Id.
117 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534.
"8 See id. In Florida Star, the Court suggested the following:
To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the government may
under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition .... To the extent
sensitive information is in the government's custody, it has even greater power to
forestall or mitigate the injury caused by its release. The government may classify
certain information, establish and enforce procedures ensuring its redacted re-
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the principal cases discussed, the Court indicated that prior to
punishing truthful publications, the government must, if practica-
ble, implement other means of realizing the particular interest.119
Therefore, the constitutionality of collateral means of protecting a
rape victim's privacy, in particular, "gag orders" and courtroom
closures, will be considered.
B. Gag Orders
To protect a rape victim's privacy, a court may order the par-
ticipants in the proceeding not to discuss the case with the me-
dia,120 or the media not to report certain aspects of the court's pro-
ceedings.121 Such judicial orders, which resemble prior restraints,122
are referred to as "gag orders. 1 2
In a case involving a judicial order directed towards the press,
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,124 a state district judge, fearing
lease, and extend a damages remedy against the government or its officials where
the government's mishandling of sensitive information leads to its dissemination.
Where information is entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than pun-
ishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against the dissemi-
nation of private facts.
Id.
119 See, e.g., Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105 (although 50 states have statutes that provide
confidentiality, "all but a handful" have found other ways of accomplishing this objective);
Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. at 310-11 (noting trial judge's failure to avail himself of
statutory opportunity to close juvenile hearing to members of press, who later broadcast
juvenile defendant's name); Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496 ("If there are privacy inter-
ests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid
public documentation or other exposure of private information."); see also Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) ("much of the risk [from disclosure of
sensitive information regarding judicial disciplinary hearings] can be eliminated through
careful internal procedures to protect the confidentiality of Commission proceedings") (cita-
tion omitted).
120 See, e.g., KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 459 U.S. 1302, 1302-03
(1982) (upholding order requiring prior clearance for communications between participants
and media).
121 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542-44 (1976) (considering
constitutionality of order restraining media from publishing or broadcasting accounts of
murder trial).
122 See, e.g., KPNX Broadcasting, 459 U.S. at 1307 (requiring previous clearance for
courtroom sketches "smacks" of prior restraint); Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 556 (prior
restraint cases are relevant to cases involving restrictive orders).
1' See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 678 (6th ed. 1990). In a trial of considerable notoriety,
the term may refer to a court order, "directed to attorneys and witnesses, to not discuss the
case with reporters." Id. The term also refers to court orders prohibiting the press from
reporting certain aspects of a trial. Id.
11 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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the prejudicial effect news would have on impaneling an impartial
jury,125 enjoined the media from publishing or broadcasting ac-
counts of any confessions or admissions made by the defendant in
a widely reported murder case.1 26 Although the Supreme Court
found that the state judge, by restraining the media, had acted
responsibly in protecting the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury,1 27 the Court held that these restrictions were
"foreclosed" by another Constitutional provision, the First Amend-
ment.1 28 The Court asserted that "prior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringe-
ment [sic] on First Amendment rights.' 29 Accordingly, although
the constitutional framers did not assign priorities between the
First and Sixth Amendments, the "barriers to prior restraint re-
main high."1 30 Concluding that less restrictive measures were avail-
able, 131 the Court held that "[t]o the extent that [the order] pro-
hibited publication based on information gained from other
sources,.., the heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a
prior restraint was not met.'13 2
KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court'33 in-
volved two judicial orders: (1) that court personnel, counsel, wit-
1" Id. at 541-43. "The crime [had] immediately attracted widespread news coverage, by
local, regional and national newspapers, radio and television stations." Id. at 542. Both the
county attorney and the defense attorney requested the restrictive order because of the pos-
sibility of prejudicial publicity. Id.
12 Id. The initial order of the county court precluded dissemination of testimony or
evidence adduced at trial; additionally, the media were required to observe the voluntary
standards outlined in the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. Id. A subsequent order of the
state district court applied until the jury was impaneled, and prohibited the petitioners
from reporting: (1) the existence or contents of a confession made by the defendant; (2)
other statements made by the defendant; (3) the contents of a note written by the defend-
ant on the night of the crime; (4) aspects of medical testimony; and (5) the identities of the
sexual assault victims and the nature of the assaults. Id. at 543-44.
127 Id. at 555; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (conferring right to trial by jury).
128 Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 555-56.
129 Id. at 559. Unlike subsequent punishment of speech, "[a] prior restraint.., has an
immediate and irreversible sanction." Id. If the threat of civil or criminal sanctions after
publication "chills" speech, a prior restraint "freezes" it, at least temporarily. Id. (citing
ALEXANDER M. BicKEL, THE MoRALry OF CONSENT 61 (1975)).
12' Id. at 561. In refusing to subordinate Sixth Amendment rights to First Amendment
rights, the Court declined to recognize the media's right to publish in all circumstances. Id.
131 Id. at 563-70. The alternative measures included, among others, the following: (1) a
change of venue to an area less exposed to publicity; (2) a postponement of trial until public
attention subsided; and (3) a sequestration of jurors. Id. at 563-64 (citing Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)).
I2 Id. at 570.
132 459 U.S. 1302 (1982).
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nesses, and jurors not speak directly with the press, and that the
sole source of information regarding the proceedings be a court-
appointed intermediary; and (2) that all sketches of jurors be
cleared by the court prior to broadcast.134 Regarding the first or-
der, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he mere potential for confu-
sion if unregulated communication between trial participants and
the press were permitted is enough to warrant" the judge's order
during actual sessions, and that protecting the judicial process
from "prejudicial outside interferences" is sufficient to warrant the
order when the court is not in session."' 5 Although the Court found
the second order "more troubling," it nevertheless believed that
the order constituted a viable alternative to the "prototypical"
prior restraint.13
Because the media were free to report on the proceedings in
the open courtroom, however, the significance of KPNX Broad-
casting in protecting a rape victim's privacy is limited. 37 It is sub-
mitted that, in the absence of a closed courtroom, a partial "gag
order" does not adequately protect rape victims' privacy.
C. Courtroom Closure
Another method utilized by some states to protect rape vic-
tims from undesirable exposure is courtroom closure. 8 In consid-
ering the constitutionality of measures that deny the media and
public access to the courtroom, it is necessary to review a few rele-
vant Supreme Court cases.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,13 9 the Court considered the is-
sue of whether members of the public have an independent consti-
tutional right of access to pretrial judicial proceedings. 140 In re-
questing that the public and the press be excluded from the
courtroom, the defense attorneys alleged that adverse publicity
would jeopardize the defendants' opportunity to receive a fair trial
following their indictment for murder. This request was granted by
Id. at 1302-03.
135 Id. at 1306-08.
1 Id. at 1307-08.
137 Id. at 1302. The protection provided by this type of "gag order" is limited because a
rape victim can be identified by the media attending the open judicial proceeding.
138 See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (1983); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 970.03(4) (West 1985).
:39 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
40 Id. at 370-71.
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the trial judge.141 In affirming the state court order, the Supreme
Court held that, under the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, the public does not have a constitutional right to attend
criminal trials.142 Although the Court acknowledged the existence
of a common-law tradition of open civil and criminal proceedings,
it asserted that the Sixth Amendment confers the right to a public
trial "only upon a defendant and only in a criminal case."'I4 Fur-
thermore, in dismissing the First Amendment claims, the Court
reasoned that, under the circumstances of the case, societal inter-
ests outweighed First Amendment concerns, and that "any denial
of access in this case was not absolute but only temporary" be-
cause a transcript of the suppression hearing was made available
after the danger of prejudice had subsided.""
It is submitted that when transcripts are made available after
a courtroom closure, additional precautions are necessary to pro-
tect the identity of rape victims. Because the victim's name may be
publicized freely once a transcript becomes available, this type of
closure would not be effective in preventing the disclosure of a
rape victim's identity. However, court officials alternatively could
implement a documentation system utilizing only the victim's
initials. 14 5
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,146 the Supreme
Court addressed the broader question of "whether the right of the
public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the
"I Id. at 375. The press and the district attorney initially did not contest the request
for closure. Id. Although the press subsequently requested access to the courtroom, the trial
judge determined that there was a reasonable probability of prejudice to the defendants. Id.
at 376. The court concluded that the defendants' right to a fair trial outweighed the inter-
ests of the press and public. Id. at 375-76.
142 Id. at 391, 393.
14I Id. at 385-87. "In conspicuous contrast with some of the early state constitutions
that provided for a public right to open civil and criminal trials, the Sixth Amendment
confers the right to a public trial only upon a defendant and only in a criminal case." Id. at
386-87 (footnote omitted); see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A.
J. 534, 538 (1965) ("[Tlhe primary purpose of a public trial and of the media's right as a
part of the public to attend and report what occurs there is to protect the accused."); Ste-
phen Madsen, Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1308, 1321
(1978) (because Sixth Amendment confers right to public trial on accused, "to elaborate a
parallel and possibly .adverse public right of access from the public trial guarantee clause
strains even flexible constitutional language beyond its proper bounds").
144 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393.
145 See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 527 n.2 (referring to rape victim by her initials in
order to preserve her privacy interests).
146 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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United States Constitution.1147 The case involved a murder trial in
which, pursuant to statutory authority,14  the trial judge had is-
sued a closure order because of the possibility of an unfair trial. "9
Noting the "prophylactic" role of the criminal justice system, 50
the Supreme Court held that right to attend criminal trials is im-
plicit in the First Amendment guarantees 5' and that absent an
overriding interest, "the trial of a criminal case must be open to
the public."'' 2 The Court attached special significance to the me-
dia's right to attend trials because the media are the public's pri-
mary source of information concerning trials. 53
17 Id. at 558. The Court noted that it had never addressed this precise issue, Gannett
having involved a right of access to hearings on pretrial motions. Id. at 563-64. Moreover,
Gannett did not preclude a public right of access to trials under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 564.
148 Id. at 560. The statute provided that "[i]n trial of all criminal cases . . . the court
may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the
conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be
violated." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (Michie 1980).
14 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560. The case involved the fourth trial of a man
indicted for murder. Id. at 559.
160 See id. at 571. The Court noted that an open system of justice, serving a "prophy-
lactic purpose," provides an outlet for "community concern, hostility, and emotion." Id. In
the absence of such a system, "natural human reactions of outrage and protest are frus-
trated and may manifest themselves in ... vengeful 'self-help.'" Id. From accusation and
trial, through punishment, the justice system restores the imbalance created by the offense.
Id. (citing Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1961)); see also HENRY WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH
130-31 (1956) (crime gives rise to community reaction of outrage).
161 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580. According to the Court, in the absence of
such freedoms, the "freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated.'" Id. (quoting
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
16' Id. at 581. The Court suggested that options such as the exclusion of witnesses from
the courtroom or sequestration could have been implemented instead of closing the court-
room. See id. However, the Court noted that First Amendment rights are not absolute and
that a trial judge may, "in the interest of fair administration of justice, impose reasonable
limitations on access to a trial." Id. at 581 n.18.
113 See id. at 571-73. The Court elaborated its position as follows:
Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word
of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print
and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as
surrogates for the public. While media representatives enjoy the same right of
access as the public, they often are provided special seating and priority of entry
so that they may report what people in attendance have seen and heard. This
"contribute[s] to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of
the functioning of the entire criminal justice system .. "
Id. at 572-73 (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
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In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,154 the Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statutory closure
provision.1' The statute excluded the press and general public
from trials for specified sexual offenses involving a victim under
the age of eighteen during the testimony of that victim. 156 In sup-
port of the provision, the state asserted that it was designed "to
encourage young victims of sexual offenses to come forward ...
[and] to preserve their ability to testify by protecting them from
undue psychological harm at trial.'
57
Acknowledging the precedent established by Richmond News-
papers, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "the press and general
public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials."'5 8
Although this right "is not absolute,"' 59 the Court added that a
closure order will be upheld only if the state shows that the closure
is narrowly tailored and serves a compelling governmental inter-
est." 0 The Globe Newspaper Court found the governmental inter-
ests posited by the state compelling, but held that these interests
did not justify mandatory closure because determination on a case-
by-case basis would be less-restrictive, yet equally effective.' 6 '
Thus, in ruling upon a courtroom closure, a court should consider
the victim's age, psychological maturity, and understanding, the
:54 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
55 Id. at 598. The trial involved the alleged forcible rape of three minor girls. Id. Dur-
ing the trial, the Globe newspaper unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to the proceed-
ings. Id. Pursuant to the statutory provision, the trial court denied the Globe's motions for-
access. Id. at 599.
"6 See MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981). The Massachusetts statute
provided, in pertinent part, the following:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon,
with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed.... the presid-
ing justice shall exclude the general public from the courtroom, admitting only
such persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
Id.
Id Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 600 (citation omitted).
'" Id. at 603. Although the right of access to criminal trials was not explicitly men-
tioned in the First Amendment, the Court acknowledged that this right was "firmly estab-
lished" in Richmond Newspapers. Id. at 603-04.
19 Id. at 606; accord Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (imposing limitations
permissible in interest of justice).
IGO Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 101-03 (1979)).
161 Id. at 607-08. A case-by-case determination of whether the state's interests necessi-
tate closure ensures that the constitutional right of the press and public will not be re-
stricted except when necessary. Id. at 609.
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desires of the victim, parents, and relatives, and the nature of the
crime. 162
Based on these principal cases, it appears that considerable
constitutional barriers must be overcome in closing a courtroom for
the protection of a rape victim. In addition, the Supreme Court
has developed a qualified right of access to preliminary hearings
under the First Amendment.16 3
CONCLUSION
The Palm Beach prosecution of Globe Communications has
renewed the public's interest in laws, and other measures such as
gag orders and courtroom closures, that restrict the disclosure of a
rape victim's identity. Such laws protect a rape victim's privacy
and physical safety, and thus encourage victims of rape to report
these violent crimes. However, such laws also clash with the First
Amendment in that they restrict the media's ability to report
truthful information.
Although the interests advanced by prohibitions against the
disclosure of a rape victim's identity undoubtedly are compelling,
the Supreme Court has never upheld such prohibitions. The hold-
ings of the relevant Supreme Court cases, however, have been nar-
row and do not preclude the statutory protection of rape victims.
As a prerequisite to proscribing the publication of a rape victim's
identity, a state must demonstrate its compelling interest by im-
plementing other preliminary protective measures, such as "gag or-
ders" and courtroom closures.
The constitutionality of laws that punish the disclosure of a
rape victim's identity will turn on several factors. First, the
prohibitions must be narrowly tailored in order to be valid under
the Constitution. Thus, because the state may not punish the dis-
162 Id. at 608. For instance, if the victim wants publicity, the legislative justifications in
support of closure should be inapplicable. Id. at 608 n.21 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 423 N.E.2d 773, 782 (Mass. 1981) (Wilkins, J., concurring)).
16 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986). In Press-Enter-
prise, a California court, at the request of the defendant in a murder trial, ordered the
courtroom closed because of national publicity. Id. at 3-4. Based on the precedent estab-
lished by Richmond Newspapers, and Globe Communications, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings was ap-
plicable to preliminary hearings as conducted in California. Id. at 13. Consequently, if the
interest asserted is the right to a fair trial, a preliminary hearing may be closed if (1) closure
would prevent a substantial probability of prejudicial publicity and (2) reasonable alterna-
tives cannot adequately protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 14.
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closure of a victim's identity if that identity was placed in the pub-
lic record, either expressly or by acquiescence, the state should be
careful to keep the victim's identity classified and off the public
record. Second, the state must apply the prohibitions to all forms
of publication indiscriminately. A prohibition that does not punish
those persons outside of the communications industry, for exam-
ple, may be declared unconstitutional for being underinclusive and
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Third, because the iden-
tity of the victim may have already been widely known, or because
the victim may have otherwise become a reasonable subject of pub-
lic concern, or because the victim may have voluntarily generated
public attention to the offense, individualized adjudication must be
provided to any person punished under the statute.
Although the media's historical self-restraint has not necessi-
tated many confrontations with the First Amendment, rape vic-
tims require legal protection, as the Palm Beach incident illus-
trates. Under proper circumstances, the Supreme Court may
uphold proscriptions on the dissemination of truthful information
and collateral measures which protect the privacy of a rape vic-
tim's identity. The Globe Communications case, unfortunately,
will "leave[] unanswered the question of how the state will protect
alleged sexual assault victims against a disclosure of their
identities. 164
Gary F. Giampetruzzi
' Globe Communications Corp., No. 91-11008MM A02, at 19.
1992]

